Frame Analysis as a Discourse Method: Framing Climate Change Politics more

Frame Analysis as a Discourse-Method: Framing ‘climate change politics’ Mat Hope – mat.hope@bris.ac.uk Paper delivered to the Post-Graduate Conference on Discourse Analysis March 2010, University of Bristol. Abstract Frame analysis is a discourse analysis method that is principally concerned with dissecting how an issue is defined and problematised, and the effect that this has on the broader discussion of the issue. Here, there is a brief discussion of the theoretical groundings of ‘frame analysis’, before a model of the framing process is proffered. Next, there is some discussion of ‘frame analysis’ methods before the model is applied (through those methods) to three key texts within the climate change politics literature. Ultimately, the analysis seeks to uncover and better understand what climate change politics ‘is’ in the context of the three texts. The analysis undertaken here serves to illustrate the usefulness of frame analysis as a research method within the broader discourse analysis schema. The paper concludes with a brief summary of the results and some reflections on the success of using frame analysis in this context, before considering some possible next steps for future research. Introduction Frame analysis is a discourse analysis method that is principally concerned with dissecting how an issue is defined and problematised, and the effect that this has on the broader discussion of the issue. This paper is in four parts. First, the theoretical foundations of ‘framing’ are discussed and ‘frames’ as a concept are located more broadly within the discourse schema. Next, the methods utilised within frame analysis are discussed before a model of the framing process is formulated. Finally, the model is applied to the case of climate change politics through a frame analysis of three significant academic texts within the field. The paper concludes with some reflection on the usefulness of frame analysis in this context, and suggests some next steps for research using frame analysis as a discourse method. I. ‘Frames’ in discourse The origins of frame analysis can be traced back to the so-called ‘linguistic turn’ in social science philosophy (coined by Bergmann 1953/1967, see also Rorty 1991). Of particular relevance to the theoretical foundations of frame analysis are linguistic pragmatics feeding into the work critical discourse analysis (CDA) scholars such as Nigel Fairclough and Ruth Wodak, the work of sociologist Erving Goffman (1974;1981), and the (perhaps more surprising) influence of artificial intelligence scholar, Marvin Minsky (1975; 1977). Linguistic pragmatics conceptualises language as ‘language-in-use’ (Blommaert 2005, 2); that is, language that is recognised as having an effect beyond the boundaries of the ‘text’ itself (Burman and Parker 1993, Fowler 1996). Such insights into intertextual relations caught the attention of scholars outside of linguistics who combined the linguistic methods with theories of power and ideology to form what became the influential Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) school (see Blommaert 2005; Chilton and Schaffner 2002; Fairclough 1992, 1995, 2003; van Dijk 1993; van Leuwen 1993; Wodak 1989). CDA was particularly influenced by the philosophy of Foucault (1972) (see Tamboukou 2008, Howarth 2000) and Althusser (1971). For the CDA scholars, “discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially shaped” (Fairclough and Wodak 1997, 258); it is a two-way causal relationship in which discourse is shaped by society, but also has a significant effect on the shaping of that society. Frame analysis shares many of the building blocks of CDA but returns somewhat to its linguistic and textual roots. While it shares the same principles of the construction of meaning, and retains a belief in the potential for discourse to affect action beyond the text (Entman 1993, Gonos 1977), it retains its methodological roots in detailed linguistic analysis. Within sociology, Erving Goffman coined the term ‘frame analysis’ to describe the process of deconstructing the individual’s “organisation of experience” (1974, 11). Goffman’s aim was to try to isolate some of the basic frameworks of understanding available in our society for making sense of events and to analyse the special vulnerabilities to which these frames of reference are subject… I assume the definitions of a situation are built up in accordance with principles of organisation which govern events – at least social ones – and our subjective involvement in them; frame is the word I use to refer to such of these basic elements as I am able to identify. (1974, 10-11) One of Goffman’s main contributions was the idea of ‘primary frameworks’. He believed that primary frameworks were the first point of the organisation of experience. He states, “we tend to perceive events in terms of primary frameworks, and the type of framework we employ provides a way of describing the event to which it is applied” (Goffman 1974, 24), asserting that “acts of daily living are understandable because of some primary framework (or frameworks) that informs them” (Goffman 1974, 26). He outlines two discrete primary frameworks; ‘the natural’ and ‘the social’ that help people to make sense of ‘what is happening’ around them. Natural frameworks “identify occurrences seen as undirected, unoriented, unanimated, unguided, ‘purely physical’”, while social primary frameworks “provide background understanding for events that incorporate the will, aim, and controlling effort of intelligence, a live agency, the chief one being the human being” (Goffman 1974, 22). As will be shown in detail later, primary frameworks form the basis of our most basic understanding of phenomena. A perhaps more surprising influence on frame analysis comes in the form of computer scientist Marvin Minsky, who had a confessed interest in “a theory of human thinking” (Minsky 1975, 215, cited in Bednarek 2004, 689). For Minsky, [w]hen one encounters a new situation… one selects from memory a substantial structure called a frame. This is a remembered framework to be adapted to fit reality by changing details as necessary./ A frame is a data-structure for representing a stereotyped situation… We can think of a frame as a network of nodes and relations./ Collections of related frames are linked together in frame systems. (1975, 212) Minsky’s frame systems are arranged in a hierarchy, with each lower level adding more detail to the phenomena, ‘event’, or ‘scene’. At the very highest level of the frame system there are “thematic superframes” which provide information at the highest level of generality (Minsky 1975, 236), just below these are ‘top-level’ frames that provide slightly more information but remain stereotypes with ‘default’ settings, and then come “subframes” which provide the detail in the scene (Minsky 1975, 223). Minsky makes the distinction between ‘language’ (as a collection of words) and ‘discourse’ (as semantics and syntax with ‘meaning’), arguing that discourse requires multiple frames. The frames being accessed by the individual go beyond simple visual cues to more abstract consideration of the phenomena. Through a process of thought, the individual must understand the setting, and the social context of the setting, operationalising multiple frame systems to do so. As such, “a discourse assembles a network of instantiated frames and subframes” (Minsky 1975, 237), and through an interpretation of the interrelatedness of the frames and the individual may be able to fathom the discourse of their situation. II. A model of the framing process There is an inherent hierarchy within the framing process with each stage relating to an increased level of detail of the discourse analysed. The model proffered here is influenced strongly by the work of Goffman (1974), Minsky (1975) and Gerhards (1995). I argue that through the operationalisation of primary frameworks, metaframes, and issue frames (in the framing process) the texts contribute to the conceptualisation of an ‘object’. This ‘object’ is then translated into a ‘problem’ through the operationalisation of a ‘framing dimension’ (Figure 1). Figure 1: The framing process Primary frameworks: In this model, the primary frameworks are conceptualised with direct reference to Goffman (1974). Primary frameworks have obvious parallels with Minsky’s (1975) ‘superframes’ in that they describe the most general and basic level of understanding. As outlined above, there are two primary frameworks that help us to organise our understanding and locate our experience; ‘the natural’ and ‘the social’ (Goffman 1974, 22). Metaframes: The term ‘metaframes’ is taken from Dombos et al (2009). These are “overarching frames of a higher level of generality” that “can be operationalised as the normative aspects of issue frames” (Dombos et al 2009, 7). Various normative assertions take the form of ‘framings’, which amalgamate to form the overarching metaframe; they are “embedded in each other” (Nerlich and Clarke 1988, 83). As such, metaframes are by no-means discrete from one another; multiple framings can contribute to a singular metaframe. As with all frames, understanding one may be contingent on understanding others. Metaframes operate on a relative scale with no ‘absolute’ understanding. Issue frames: At the core of the framing process are issue frames. These frames “provide a relatively coherent story/reasoning in which issue specific prognostic elements responds to issue specific diagnostic elements” (Dombos et al 2009, 6). At this level, “these characteristically different textual features are translated into different propositional systems and assembled in the interpreter’s working memory” (Woong Rhee 1997, 31). Issue-frames are close to what Minsky (1975) would describe as ‘subframes’ with multiple pieces of information filling ‘terminals’ that contribute to the ‘subframe’ whole (Minsky 1975, 223). Framing dimension: Once the frames have been established, it remains to be seen how the framing process which has by now created a more-coherent object - transform that object into a problem. This element has been best conceptualised in scholarship which identifies the various ways in which social action groups define then problematise their chosen issue in order to achieve their political goals (see Benford and Snow 2000, Capek 1993, Gerhards 1995). To achieve these goals, Gerhards asserts that they “must first define the empirical phenomenon, fact or occurrence as an issue, then label the phenomenon as a problem that the political system should deal with” (1995, 228). In doing this, they operationalise the first of Gerhards’ five framing dimensions; translating the ‘issue’ into a ‘problem’ (Gerhards 1995, 227). There remains one ambiguity which deserves some note; the relationship between the authors (as agents) and frames (as an explanatory theoretical unit); in particular, the issue of intention. Frames can be utilised intentionally: they can promote a ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ image (Levin et al 1998), persuade (Johnston 1995), or be deliberately obtuse (Wilson 1990). Much evidence of frames being used in these ways can be found in the study of media discourse (see Boykoff 2008). However, here frames are understood as operationalised rather than utilised. They are ‘activated’ through the use of particular language, semantics, and syntax (Nerlich and Clarke 1988). In this case, the authors are not intentionally framing ‘climate change’ or ‘politics’ to deliberately affect the construction of ‘climate change politics’. Instead, they discuss the (relatively neutral) concepts within the boundaries of their own normative ideals and with reference to their selected empirical evidence thus operationalising the frames which determine the various ‘meanings’ of ‘climate change politics’. III. Frame analysis methods Here, a ‘micro-discourse analysis’ of three texts is undertaken (see Alvesson and Karreman 2000, Okada 2006, Johnston 1995); Ulrich Beck’s (2009) World at Risk, Anthony Giddens’ (2009) Climate Change Politics, and Steve Vanderheiden’s (2008) Atmospheric Justice. Micro-discourse analysis “traces its roots backs to linguistics” and allows for detailed analysis of the ‘semantics’ and ‘syntax’ of the texts (Johnston 1995, 220). The project is conducted in two stages. First, a qualitative content analysis ascertains the broad content of each text providing a database from which the passages that are most relevant to the question can be selected for more detailed analysis. This first reading allows the text to be seen as a “holistic construct” (Johnston 1995, 221). This is important as “[t]he text is the central empirical referent in micro-discourse analysis, and its integrity should be maintained” (Johnston 1995, 221-222). An understanding of the texts as a whole is necessary to place the micro-analysis into context (and avoid the selected passages being viewed in isolation, thus potentially affecting the meaning of the content) (Titscher et al 2000). Next, passages are selected which are most relevant to the research question and placed in matrices. This technique is borrowed and adapted from the ‘signature matrices’ of Creed et al (2002). The analysis is then extrapolated and the argument developed to show how ‘climate change politics’ is framed at each stage of the framing process. Micro-discourse analysis is used to study the semantics and syntax of a selection of passages extracted, but not disconnected from, the texts as wholes. This, combined with analysis of the operationalisation of Gerhards’ first framing dimension (problematisation), allows the development of a more holistic view of what climate change politics ‘is’. The study is open to many of the criticisms levied at most qualitative and ‘discourse’ analysis; in particular those of subjectivity (lack scientific rigour) and empirical (‘real world’) applicability. The study has tried to control for both of these. Firstly, the problem of subjectivity is dealt with through the theoretical grounding – that is, it is perfectly acceptable for the study to be seen as subjective as there is no such thing as ‘objective’. Beyond this though, the study tries to be as transparent as possible (the matrices are all publicly available and all excerpts are cited and sourced). The hope is that by increasing the transparency, readers can trace the basic (albeit subjective) logic of the analysis and, if not, the data is available to them to dispute the study’s findings. Secondly, the applicability of the study beyond the three texts comes from the method, not the findings themselves. Given that this is a somewhat experimental study, the most significant insight comes in the form of the process it utilises rather than the conclusions it draws. Needless to say, there is hopefully some value in the study’s findings as well. IV: Framing ‘climate change politics’ By applying the model to three texts, insight can be gained into the affects of framing in these cases. ‘Hybrid’ primary frameworks in Giddens, Vanderheiden and Beck: In order to determine which primary frameworks are being employed in the three texts, a definition matrix was constructed and a textual micro-analysis undertaken. Passages were selected where the authors were talking explicitly about climate change in a definitional or descriptive sense; either as an issue, a problem, or an event. The semantics and syntax are then analysed in order to determine whether the issue is framed with a natural primary framework, or a social primary framework. It became apparent that none of the authors are employing a strictly ‘natural’ or ‘social’ primary framework. Further to this, the selected passages relied on an understanding of both the natural and the social frameworks. Climate change within the context of the three texts is not understandable unless there is the constant application of both the social and natural frameworks together, simultaneously, constantly, and intertwined. If ‘the social’ aspect of climate change was removed, then what would remain would essentially be ‘the weather’ (which is not ‘climate change’). If ‘the natural’ aspect of climate change was removed, then what would remain is a discussion of the distribution of a common good (which is to overlook much of what constitutes ‘climate change’ also). In the passages, ‘the social’ and ‘the natural’ primary frameworks were not being operationalised simultaneously but were contingent on one another; climate change could not be understood in any terms other than a ‘hybrid’ primary framework. ‘Neoliberal’ and ‘rationalist’ metaframes in Giddens and Vanderheiden: Giddens and Vanderheiden both invoke ‘neoliberal’1 and ‘rationalist’ metaframes when outlining the political problems arising from the climate change issue. The neoliberal frame emerges through assertions of the primacy of the nation-state in an anarchical international arena. This is particularly evident in discussion of the Kyoto Protocol but also in conceptual discussions of ‘fairness’ and ‘justice’ in which it is presumed the state will be actor who administrates any new regime. 1 ‘neoliberal’ is used here in what could be described as an ‘international relations’ sense (rather than a economic, or other, sense) The ‘rationalist’ metaframe is operationalised when the authors discuss action on an individual level. Giddens invokes a characterisation of the individual as self-interested and inherently unmotivated when he highlights the human tendency to reject constraints on lifestyle as there is ‘life to be lived’ (2009, 2), while Vanderheiden conceptualises individuals as ‘egoists’. For both, involved actors are ‘rational’ beings that pursue self-interested ends in both the private (personal) arena as anti-ecological consumers, and at the national/ international arena while acting as State ‘officials’. An institutional-constructivist metaframe in Beck: In contrast to Giddens and Vanderheiden, Beck operationalises an institutional-constructivist metaframe which stresses the discursive processes that lead to the construction of ‘climate change’, and emphasises the inadequacy of state-based approaches to discussing social problems and international politics with ‘climate change’ being an exemplar amalgamation (for him) of both. The institutional-constructivist metaframe is composed of two framings: an ‘institutional’ framing, and a ‘constructivist’ framing. The constructivist framing outlines how ‘‘[n]ature’ and the ‘destruction of nature’ are institutionally produced and defined (in conflicts between lay people and experts) within industrially internalized nature’ (2009, 90). Within this constructive environment, ‘discourse coalitions’ ‘take center stage’ (2009, 89); they are ‘discursive landscape architects: they create, design, and alter ‘cognitive maps’, ‘narrative frameworks’, and ‘taboos’’ (2009, 89). The institutionalist framing is more concerned with how ‘constructions of reality’ can be distinguished as to whether they are more ‘real’ depending on ‘[t]he closer they are to and in institutions’ (2009, 89). The effect of this institutionalist-constructivist metaframe is that a politics of climate change emerges which is less concerned with addressing the problem, and more concerned with defining that problem. There is not only a politics of climate change, but climate change itself is inherently political as a concept in so much as it is constructed, and these definitions compete for proximity to institutions within the social realm. Selected issue frames: Ecological modernisation and the ‘ensuring state’ in Giddens Giddens’ metaframes encase a number of issue frames. The most significant is ecological modernisation. Ecological modernisation is a theory of development that is primarily concerned with ‘greening’ modernisation along the current dominant lines of western economic development. In this case, ecological modernisation derives its normative value from Giddens’ neoliberal and rationalist metaframes since its policies require state-leadership of economistic and rational individuals. The state has a natural role to play in this by setting targets and incentives. Under the same issue-frame, Giddens also introduces the concept of the ‘ensuring state’ which is ‘responsible for monitoring public goals and for trying to make sure they are realized in a visible and acceptable fashion’ (2009, 69). A rights-based approach to emissions reductions in Vanderheiden The continued failure of the rationalist parties within the neoliberal international environ to commit to outright reductions in GHG emissions leads Vanderheiden to recommend the entrenchment of three types of ‘rights’ within a climate regime; emissions rights, environmental rights, and development rights. While Vanderheiden operationalises similar metaframes to Giddens, his issue frames at first appear markedly different. While Giddens is concerned with market mechanisms and technological innovation, Vanderheiden is much more concerned with fair economic design thorough entrenched rights. There are, however, marked similarities also. Both deal with issues concerning nation-states, inherently selfinterested individuals, and the relationship between economic development and emissions reductions. As such, the metaframes do not dictate what issue frames will be discussed, but the way that the issue frames are discussed. The metaframes act as a common reference point for both texts in this case. While the issue frames and approaches are different, the problem (confronted by, through, and with ‘climate change politics’) remains essentially the same. Cosmopolitan Political Realism and social (r)evolution in Beck Having led us through the (de)construction of climate change as a social problem, Beck turns his attention to the likely transformations necessary in meeting climate change as a sociological challenge. Beck outlines five principles of a ‘cosmopolitan political realism’ that must be realised in the face of the impending climate change threat. They can be summarised as: 1. No nation can master its problems alone 2. Global problems can only be addressed through cosmopolitan solutions 3. International organisations are institutions in their own right; they are not just the aggregation of nation-state interests 4. National sovereignty is counterproductive at the international level 5. Unilateralism in uneconomic; cosmopolitanism is the most ‘economical’ model (Beck 2009, 207-209) These transformations, Beck asserts, lead to a ‘global subpolitics’ that is based on ‘decoupling politics from government’ in a ‘cosmopolitan moment’ which sees the social institutions of the world continuing their evolution into the second modernity (Beck 2009, 95). At this stage, the cosmopolitan world risk society is more than the aggregation of the actions of national governments but ‘the sum of the scopes for action of the national governmental institutions and bureaucracies plus the deliberate use of the cooperative capacities of transnational networks’ (Beck 2009, 103-104). Cosmopolitan political realism and its global subpolitics are derived out of Beck’s institutional-constructivist metaframes since the logic of the institutionalist framing leads to the deconstruction of old institutions based around the nation-state as new threats (such as climate change) become more proximate to society itself. This deconstruction in turn leads to a reconstruction of the problem as cosmopolitan which highlights the deficiencies and inefficiencies of the dominant neoliberal free-market economic model of the first modernity. While Giddens’ and Vanderheiden’s metaframes lead them to issues concerning economic restructuring and the nation-state/international level, Beck’s institutionalist-constructivist metaframe naturally leads to discussions of a more radical nature. While Giddens and Vanderheiden trouble themselves with solutions to a well-defined problem, Beck instead dedicates attention to the evolution of the problem itself and the institutional restructuring that will accompany it. As such, ‘climate change’ is framed by Beck as with a considerably different ‘politics’ that has markedly different consequences to the ‘climate change politics’ apparent in Giddens’ and Vanderheiden’s texts. An international framing dimension: The final part of the framing process is the operationalising Gerhards’ first framing dimension (1995, 226). The framings outlined in the previously represent the ‘definition’ of climate change politics as an ‘object’ – that is, they have identified the actors, policies, and processes that are integral within climate change politics – but it is yet to be outlined what dimension this object operates in. In each text, climate change politics is (on way or another) operationalised as an object within international politics. In each, the globalism of the problem is asserted leading to discussion of international (or in Beck’s case, cosmopolitan) responses. Conclusion The frame analysis undertaken here traces the development of ‘climate change politics’ through three texts. What emerges is a map of the construction of three related but different visions of ‘climate change politics’. Figure 2 (below) summarises each stage of the constructions as outlined by the frame analysis. Figure 2: Framing climate change politics All three texts operationalise a ‘hybrid’ primary framework, calling into question the usefulness of Goffman’s (1974) original conceptualisation in this case. Next Giddens and Vanderheiden apply ‘neoliberal’ and ‘rationalist’ metaframes. This leads them both to address issues of economic development and incentives for action; Giddens through market incentives and ecological modernisation, and Vanderheiden through entrenched environmental rights. Beck operationalises a wholly different metaframe; that of institutionalconstructivism. This leads to him discussing the more radical issues of institutional breakdown and reconstruction in a system defined by cosmopolitan political realism and its related global subpolitics. Considerations for future research: The obvious next stage is to take frames ‘off the page’. This study has shown the potential for tracing the evolution of an idea or problem through and across three different texts. With some development, the model of the framing process formulated and applied here could also be applied to discourse-as-action as well as discourse-as-language. I will go on to apply this method (with some refinement) to Congressional climate change debates in the hope of uncovering answers to a similar question as the one posed here; how does the US Congress frame ‘climate change’? In doing this I again follow Minsky, for whom [t]he primary purpose in problem solving should be better to understand the problem space… not - as is usually assumed – to find solutions; once the space is adequately understood, solutions to problems will more easily be found. (1975, 259) By tracing Congressional activity related to climate change, a better understanding of their politics of climate change can emerge. Once the politics of climate change is better understood in context, then solutions – or the process by which to design solutions – can be better formulated, debated, and applied. References Althusser, L. 1971. Lenin and philosophy and other essays. New York (US): Monthly Review Press Alvesson, M., and Karreman, D. 2000. ‘Varieties of Discourse: On the study of Organizations through Discourse Analysis’. Human Relations, Vol. 53, No. 9, pp. 1125-1149 Beck, U. 2009, World at Risk. 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